[Excerpt] On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation's mutual fund companies reported how they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest. The disclosure is the result of Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry strenuously opposed. This report evaluates how the 10 largest mutual fund families voted when presented with the opportunity to curb CEO pay abuses at a dozen S&P 500 companies in 2004. We chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, "The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation. "
Executive Summary
On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation's mutual fund companies reported how they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest. The disclosure is the result of Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry strenuously opposed.
This report evaluates how the 10 largest mutual fund families voted when presented with the opportunity to curb CEO pay abuses at a dozen S&P 500 companies in 2004. We chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, "The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation."
We found that, when it comes to voting proxies on proposals involving CEO pay abuses, there is significant variation among fund families. The scores in our survey ranged from a high of 100% for American Century to a low of 20% for Putnam.
Fidelity, the nation's largest fund family and the most vocal opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 9th out of 10 in our survey with a 25% score. Vanguard, the other leading opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 2nd in the survey with a 75% score.
Although the SEC rule does not require mutual funds to disclose business relationships with portfolio companies, our own research indicates that, of the 120 proxy voting decisions in this survey, 25 involved a mutual fund advisor that has a business relationship with the portfolio company.
These widespread conflicts of interest not only underline the importance of transparent proxy voting by mutual funds, but also point to the need to enhance the SEC rule to require mutual fund advisors to disclose business relationships with portfolio companies.
Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting Disclosure
On August 31, 2004, for the first time, the nation's mutual fund companies reported how they cast their proxy votes at the public companies in which they invest on behalf of their mutual fund shareholders. The disclosure is the result of new Securities and Exchange Commission rules adopted in January 2003, rules that the AFL-CIO first petitioned for in December 2000 and that the mutual fund industry strenuously opposed. Now mutual fund companies must do what investment firms that manage private pension plans have long been required to do by the Department of Labor-tell their clients how they cast proxy votes on their behalf at the annual shareholder meetings that every public corporation holds. At these meetings, shareholders have the responsibility to vote on the critical decisions shaping each company's governance-decisions such as who will serve on the board of directors, how the CEO will be paid and what general policies the shareholders will recommend to the company's board. Casting proxy votes on these issues is the most direct means for shareholders to oversee the corporations they own.
Millions of working families, including more than six million union households, invest their retirement savings in mutual funds, yet have been kept in the dark as to how mutual funds use their money to influence corporate elections.
1 For these families, proxy vote disclosure represents a long-overdue victory. Moreover, if greater transparency of mutual fund proxy voting leads the $7.4 trillion mutual fund industry to become more engaged in corporate governance, as the SEC reasoned in issuing its final rule, it will benefit all public company investors and not just fund shareholders.
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Mutual funds own 22% of U.S. corporate stock, so their proxy votes on such issues as CEO pay and director elections can be decisive.
3 While mutual funds have a legal duty to cast these votes in the best interests of their investors, mutual fund firms can have an economic interest in voting with management even if such votes may not be in the interest of fund investors. This conflict of interest stems from mutual fund firms' desire to sell lucrative 401(k) management and other financial services to the same companies at which they vote proxies on behalf of mutual fund investors.
It is this conflict that may lead mutual funds to act as rubberstamps for corporate management regardless of the best interests of their investors. To provide the transparency necessary to rein in this conflict, the AFL-CIO petitioned the SEC in December 2000 to adopt rules requiring disclosure of mutual fund proxy votes. In the wake of subsequent scandals at companies like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, the AFL-CIO again called in the SEC in July 2002 to require mutual funds to disclose their votes.
When the SEC responded with a proposed rule in September 2002, a then-record 8,000 individual and institutional investors sent comment letters to the SEC, the overwhelming majority in support of disclosure. 4 Only the mutual fund industry, led by Fidelity Investments and Vanguard, opposed it. Despite intense industry opposition, the SEC voted 4-1 to approve the proposed rule in January As a result, mutual fund investors now have the information necessary to determine if the votes mutual fund companies cast truly represent investors' best interests, as required by law, and do not represent an effort to curry favor with the CEOs of portfolio companies in order to win lucrative contracts for managing employee benefit plans.
To mark the release of the mutual fund proxy votes--and enable investors to more easily evaluate and interpret their fund's voting practices--the AFL-CIO prepared this report evaluating how the nation's ten largest mutual fund families cast their proxy votes in 2004 on executive pay proposals at twelve S&P 500 companies with clearly excessive CEO pay and poor performance. We chose executive compensation as our benchmark because, in the words of billionaire investor Warren Buffet, "The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation."
5 The report also highlights business relationships between the mutual fund firms and the twelve companies.
We encourage mutual fund investors and 401(k) plan trustees to use this report to evaluate whether their mutual fund company, or a mutual fund company that they are considering, is casting its proxy votes in a way that is consistent with their best interests.
Mutual Funds and Executive Compensation
Corporate governance experts have long been concerned by the failure of mutual fund companies to challenge management on corporate governance. The consequences of their conflicted voting practices are perhaps most apparent in the skyrocketing CEO pay over the past two decades. In 1980, CEO pay stood at approximately 42 times the average worker. In 2003, CEO pay reached 301 times the average worker's pay. 6 The majority of this increase has been due to stock options, which have become the biggest component of today's CEO pay packages.
The AFL-CIO supports reasonable and just compensation for all workers, including executives. But by any standard, many of today's executive compensation packages are excessive and bear no relationship to performance. In 2003, for example, earnings for the US's largest 500 companies grew by a median of 9.6 percent, while the median total pay for the chief executives at these companies jumped by 22 percent. 7 These executive pay excesses come at the expense of shareholders, as well as the company and its employees.
The disconnect between CEO pay and long-term corporate performance remains the biggest failure of our corporate governance system. As Richard Breeden, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, recently warned, "We have not made any progress on pervasive abuses in the compensation process and that is the root of most of the big frauds."
In this report, we look at how the nation's largest mutual fund families cast their proxy votes on a representative cross-section of executive compensation proposals at twelve S&P 500 companies with clearly excessive CEO pay and poor performance. For each of the twelve votes, the report includes a case study that describes the executive compensation abuse and the issue on which shareholders were asked to vote.
Methodology and Sources
Under the new SEC disclosure rule, each mutual fund associated with a fund family is required to disclose its proxy votes. Because large mutual fund companies such as Fidelity act as advisors to hundreds of mutual funds, a particular stock may be held by dozens of separate mutual funds within a particular fund family. In many cases, mutual fund families cast their proxy votes as block, but this is not always the case.
For example, Fidelity index funds, which are managed by Geode Capital under a sub-advisory arrangement, use separate proxy voting guidelines from other Fidelity funds. As a result, Fidelity index funds did not vote in the same way as its non-index funds on many votes. We also observed that Janus and T. Rowe price mutual funds did not always vote as a block.
Therefore, the proxy votes disclosed in this report represent the vote cast by what we estimate to be the majority of the shares of a particular stock held by a mutual fund family. These estimates are based on recent shareholder data from LionShares, which is compiled primarily from SEC Form 13-F and N-30D filings. We caution, however, that the portfolio data for a mutual fund may not correspond to the fund's portfolio on the record date for a particular shareholder meeting.
To identify potential business relationships between the adviser to a mutual fund family and the twelve S&P 500 companies, we relied on databases provided by Nelson's Marketplace and Larkspur DataMaster Pro. Both of these sources aggregate data from the Form 5500s that corporate retirement plans are required to file with the Department of Labor.
Key Findings
• When it comes to voting proxies on proposals involving CEO pay abuses, there is significant variation among fund families. The scores in our survey ranged from a high of 100% for American Century to a low of 20% for Putnam. Putnam was also the only fund that failed to cast a vote at a portfolio company included in this survey (Putnam did not vote on a CSX shareholder proposal to rein in golden parachutes or on any other issue subject to a vote at CSX's 2004 annual meeting).
• The survey results indicate that the SEC rule requiring mutual fund proxy vote disclosure appears to have had a significant impact on the voting practices of some fund families. In the 1990s, mutual funds reflexively voted with management, regardless of the best interests of their mutual fund investors. While this still appears to be the case at some fund families, others appear to be increasingly willing to oppose management when necessary to protect long-term shareholder value.
• Fidelity, the nation's largest fund family and the most vocal opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 9th out of 10 in our survey with a 25% score. Fidelity voted against all eight shareholder proposals to rein in runaway CEO pay, but also opposed three of the four management proposals.
• Vanguard, the other leading opponent to proxy vote disclosure, ranked 2nd in the survey with a 75% score. Vanguard was one of only two mutual fund families that voted against all four management proposals seeking excessive executive compensation (American Century was the other).
• There was only one proposal for which all of the mutual fund families holding the stock voted in the same way. Nine fund families voted against a management proposal seeking to renew the Stock Incentive Plan at Broadcom (American Funds did not hold the stock). This is perhaps no surprise, since an overwhelming majority (89 percent) of Class A shares voted against the plan. As The New York Times observed about Broadcom, "just when you thought you had seen the most outrageous transfer of shareholder wealth to executives through stock options, along comes a company that tops them all." 9 Unfortunately, the proposal passed over the objection of outside shareholders because the company's dual class stock structure gives insiders disproportionate voting power.
• One shortcoming of the SEC rule is that it does not allow investors to determine whether a conflict of interest compromised their mutual fund's proxy vote at a particular company, since the rule does not require mutual funds to disclose their business relationships with the portfolio companies. Our own research indicates that, of the 120 proxy voting decisions reported in this survey, 25 involved a mutual fund advisor that has a business relationship with the portfolio company. Fidelity maintained the most business relationships (8), followed by Capital Research and Management (as advisor to the American Funds) (5), and Vanguard (4).
• These widespread conflicts of interest not only underline the importance of transparent proxy voting by mutual funds, but also point to the need to enhance the SEC rule to require mutual fund companies to disclose business relationships with portfolio companies. 
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Janus 71%
4.
Oppenheimer Funds 70%
5.
T. Rowe Price 58%
6.
American Funds 50%
7.
Franklin Templeton 45%
AIM Investments 30%
9. Excludes INVESCO funds, which are now part of AIM, but vote separately.
12 Janus funds voted both "for" and "against" this proposal, but it appears that the majority of shares were voted "for".
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T. Rowe Price's index funds, which appear to hold the majority of shares, voted "against" this proposal. Other T. Rowe Price funds voted "for" this proposal. Business Week ranked CSX 447 in the S&P 500 and second to last in its industry for its poor performance. Business Week also gave the CSX an "F" on four performance measures (1-year total return, 1-year sales growth, 1-year profit growth and return on equity). 27 Likewise, independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis and Co. gave CSX a "D" in pay-for-performance, noting that CSX paid more than its peers, but performed worse than its peers. In 2002 while the airline industry was struggling with a sharp drop in business from the September 11 terrorist attacks, Delta Air Lines paid $13.4 million (including tax payments) to set up a bankruptcyproof trust to fund the retirement benefits of then-CEO Leo Mullin, who retired May 1, 2004. At the time, the company was hemorrhaging money, slashing jobs and seeking government assistance. 32 All told, Delta paid $45 million into pension trusts for 35 Delta executives. 33 Mr. Mullin's pension was based on 28.5 years of service even though his actual tenure was only 6.5 years.
Company Profiles
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These executive pension payments occurred at a time when Delta's pension plans for union employees --which are only partially insured in the event of bankruptcy --were underfunded, and after nonunion employees had been switched to less generous "cash balance" retirement plan. The ensuing controversy caused the company to discontinue its executive retirement plan and to withhold a final payment to the executive trusts.
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Business Week ranked the company near the bottom (#485) of the S&P 500, and last in its industry for its poor performance. Business Week also gave Delta an "F" on eight performance measures (1-year total return, 3-year total return, 1-year sales growth, 3-year sales growth, 1-year profit growth, 3-year profit growth, net margin and return on equity). 36 Likewise, independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis and Co. gave Delta an "F" in pay-for-performance, noting that Delta paid about the same as its peers, but performed significantly worse than its peers.
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Inflated retirement benefits for executives undermines shareholders' efforts to link pay to performance. For this reason, many favor requiring shareholder approval of these arrangements. At Delta's April 23, 2004 annual shareholder meeting, 53 percent of votes cast supported a proposal to seek shareholder approval for extraordinary retirement benefits for senior executives --such as granting unearned years of service credit, accelerated vesting of rights under a benefit plan, or using bankruptcy-proof trusts to fund supplementary executive retirement plans. . 44 In fact, the company's share price has lagged its peer group index for the one, two and three years ending January 31, 2004. As a result, the department store chain fell to 203 rd in Business Week's 2003 S&P 500 Performance Ranking, from 34 th the prior year, using eight criteria of financial success. Business Week gave Kohl's an "F" grade for both oneand three-year total return. 45 Because stock option grants have no downside risk below the strike price, they encourage executives to adopt "shoot for the moon" business strategies that are designed to promote short-term stock price rather than long-term corporate value. Moreover, they can reward executives for temporary short-term results, even if this increase follows a long period of underperformance or is not sustainable. At Kohl's April 28, 2004 annual meeting, shareholders voted 25 percent of the votes cast in favor of granting actual shares of stock for meeting performance benchmarks, and to require that executives hold those shares for as long as they remain company executives. If telecommunications manufacturer Lucent Technologies CEO Patricia Russo is terminated without cause, she is entitled to immediate vesting of 1,220,000 stock options and 550,000 restricted shares, as well as two years' salary plus target bonus and continued benefit coverage and equity vesting for two years. She is also entitled to a tax gross up on her golden parachute. In total, Ms. Russo's severance benefits are worth an estimated $10 million or more, at a time when the company is slashing retiree benefits for ordinary workers. 49 In 2002, her first year on the job, Ms. Russo made $38 million while shareholders saw their investment plummet by 75 percent. Ms. Russo was featured in Fortune magazine's article entitled "Have They No Shame?" on CEOs whose performance "stank" while they "got paid more than ever." 50 This year, Lucent topped the Wall Street Journal's list of the worst 5-year performers. 51 Business Week ranked Lucent 473 in the S&P 500 and 30th of 35th in its industry for its poor performance. Business Week also gave Lucent an "F" on seven performance measures (3-year total return, 1-year sales growth, 3-year sales growth, 1-year profit growth, 3-year profit growth, net margin and return on equity).
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Requiring shareholder approval of executives' employment agreements is one way that golden parachutes can be limited. Moreover, excessive severance benefits can dramatically increase the cost of terminating an under-performing CEO, and reward the CEO for poor performance leading up to his or her termination. Oracle's buyout offer may have been triggered by PeopleSoft's recent poor performance. Business Week ranked PeopleSoft 411 in the S&P 500, and 20 out of 28 in the software and services industry. Business Week graded PeopleSoft an "F" for 3-year total return, 1-year profit growth, and return on equity. 56 Independent proxy voting consultant Glass Lewis & Co. gave PeopleSoft an "F" for pay-for-performance, noting that "[t]he Company's compensation to its CEO was significantly more than the median" for comparable companies. 57 In response to shareholder concern, PeopleSoft has recently taken steps to reduce its total potential dilution from stock options, which reached 35.5 percent compared to its peer group median of 25.1 percent. 58 PeopleSoft also promised to add performance-based requirements to its executives' future equity compensation awards. 
